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Abstraet 
Tu ovcrcome deficils 01 lhe Lindahl solulion concepl when lhe econlJl1ly does nol 
exhibil conslanl relurns lo scale. Kaneko (1977a) introduced lhe concepl (lf a ratio 
equilibriulII. The ratio cOl'l'e.l'pOllllellCe sdects for each economy its sel 01' ralio equilibrium 
allocations. In Ihis papcr we provide a simple markel game lhal double illll'lel//t'nts lhe ratio 
con'espondence in Nash and strong equilibria. 
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1. lntroduction 
Given sorne domain 01' economies, a choice correspondellce sdeds lor each 
ewnomy a set 01' feasiblc alJoeations. The choice cOlTespondenee may he thought 
01' as an abstraet representation nI' either the ideal s 01' the soeiety. or the 
preferences 01' a planner. The problem ol' 1Il1lllipulatioll arises when agents in a 
soeiety have information about the true nature 01' the economy that is nol Known 10 
the planner. 11' we were lo ask the agents directly .. what do you know" and then 
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apply the given correspondence, sorne agent may strategically use this information 
to manipulate the allocation recommended by the correspondence. 
Given the possibility 01' manipulation, the (Nash) illlplemelltalioll problem is to 
design a game such that when we allow for strategic play, Ihe allocations thal 
result from (Nash) equilibria of the game, are exactly the allocations that the given 
corresp0ndence selects. 11' such a game can be found we say that Ihe game 
implemeflls Ihe choice correspolldellce 011 Ihe dOl 11 a in . 
In this paper we consider economies with Pllblic goods, and we are interested in 
choice correspondences that select efficient and individually rational allocations. 
This Iiterature has a long history in economics. Samuelson (1954) conjectured that 
any decentralized Cspontaneous') mechanism for allocating public goods effi-
cíently would be doomed to fail. as ..... it is in the selfish interest of each person 
to give false signals" (Samuelson, 1954, pp. 388). Samuelson' s intuition can be 
stated formally ao; a theorem, proved by HlIrwicz (1972), showing that Ihere does 
not exist a choice correspondence which, when we ask players to directly reveal 
their preferences. yields Pareto-optimal and individually rational outcomes. How-
ever, subsequently, by using abstract strategy spaces, Hurwicz (1979a,b), Walker 
(19X I), McKelvey (1989), and Tian (¡ 989), developed games that, for constant 
returns to scale economies, implemented the Lindahl correspondence. Thus the 
Nash equilibrium outcomes of their games are both Pareto-optimal and individu-
ally rationa!. 
In this parer we depart from Ihe previolls work in Ihree respects: (i) we allow 
ror more general technology than constant returns 10 scale (CRS); (ii) we do not 
exclllde th-: pO;,isibility that sorne subset of the agents may communicate and 
conspire to Il'<lnipulate the outcome, and (¡ii) we want the gamc form 10 resemble 
Ihe operation of a ·Illarket'. We address each of these points in turno 
Most of the public goods implelllentation literature has focused on the Lindahl 
conespondence. The Lindahl correspondence is often viewed as the public goods 
equivalent of the Walrasian correspondence for private goods economies. How-
ever. in the absence of CRS, Lindahl pricing generates a slIrpllls (01' deficit) that 
mus! be shared alllong agents to obtain an efficient olltcome. The question Ihen 
'Irises; 'le :->lIblic goods are typically publicly provided, if the technology is jointly 
owned by the sociely. how is the share rule delerlllined'? In general the answer is 
not transparent. However, even if we can jllstify a particular share rule, the 
Lindahl allocations may fail to be in the core as defined by Foley (1970). Indeed 
the Lindahl allocations may rail to be individllally rational. Kaneko o 977a), 
Moulin (J 9R9). Thus ir we are interested in correspondences that select efficient 
and individually rational outcomes, Ihe Lindahl correspondence loses its appeal. 
Silllilarly the balanced linear cost share equilibria recently introduced by Mas-
Colell and Silvestre (J 989) 'liso fails to always select individually rational 
allocations, Wilkie (1989). However, the ralio corre.l'pOl1dellCC', introduced in 
Kaneko ( I 977a,b l. meets our rcquirements and so we focus on implementing il. 
Our second point concerns Ihe possibility 01" coalition formation. Most of the 
2
gamcs proposed in Ihe lilcralure Ihus faro has been concerned wilh slralegic play 
by individuals. exceplions being Schmeidler (1980) and recenlly Peleg ( I 996a.b). 
We do not wish lo exclude Ihe possibility thal agents could communicate and form 
coalitions. with Ihe hope that by joint strategic play they could improve their 
welfare. lndeed. as we are interested in implementing core allocations. il seems 
inconsistent lo preclude such communicalion. Ir we lake this possibility seriously. 
Ihen we need to use the s/mllg ('tlllilibriul1I concept. Necessary and Sufficienl 
conditions for implcmcntation in strong equilibria are provided in Dutta and Sen 
(J 991 ). Ideally we would like to construct a game with the property that the strong 
and Nash equilibrium (lutcomes coincide. and these coincide with the set of 
allocations chosen by our given correspondence. a property called dOllbf¡, imple-
mel/ta/iol/ by Maskin ( 1985). 
Finally. we want Ihe game fmm lo be simple. Many games have becll critieized 
because they havc large. abSlraet slrategy spaces and complicated outcome func-
tions. We would like our game form to he 'similar' to the choice correspondence it 
is implementing. In particular. if we are implemcnting a choice correspondence 
that uses a market approach lo solve allocation problems, Ihen Ihe gallle should 
ideally be a . market gallle'. That is. the strategies are . prices and quantities', ami 
Ihe outcome funclion should allow each agenl lo choose [rom sorne hudget. 
Dur results can be stated succinctly. We provide a simple market game Ihat 
double implcmeots the ratio correspondence. Thus both the slrong and Nash 
equilibrium outcomes are efficienl and individually rationa\. We Ihen show Ihat 
wilh a simple modificalion to Ihe oulcome function we can double implement the 
ratio corrcspondence hy a game that is both continuous and always feasible, 
Similar rcsults, on a differenl doma in are found in the recent work of Pe1eg 
(1 496b), which double impkments the Lindahl correspondence. on Ihe domain (Jf 
constant returns lo scale economies, by a continuous and feasible mechanism. 
We c10se Ihis seclion by providing a brief outline of the papeL Seclion 2 
presenls the definitions and Ihe solulions. Section 3 presents our maio results and 
relates thcm 10 Ihe lilerature. The Illodified continuous and feasible market game is 
inlroduced in Sel'lion .... Sorne concluding remarks are then offered. For furlher 
properlies of Ihe ratio correspondence, the reader is referred to Moulill ( 1(89) and 
Wilkie (1989), where Ihe solutions for ecol1omies wi¡h public goods are sludied 
from an axiomatic perspective, and to Kaneko (1977b) which links ralio alloca-
lions lo Ihe oulcomes 01' a vOling game. An generalization of ralio equilibria to a 
larger domain is provided in Diamantaras and Wilkie (1994). 
2. Notation and detinitions 
We considcr a domain 01' ecollolllies (?:" where ¡here is one private good and a 
set L = { 1,2, .... k} 01" public goods. There is a sel J = { I , 2 ..... II} of agents. Each 
agenl' s consumplion set is :Il ~ + l. A consumption bundle for ea('h i E J is a pair 
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(X¡, y) E :)1 ~ + 1, where x, is hcr eonsumption of the private good, and y is the 
vector of public good levels. For eaeh i, ti ¡ is any funetion representing her 
preferenees defined on ~lt ~ + l. We assume that eaeh u; is inereasing, strictly 
increasing in Xi' and continuous un ~)I~:I. For eaeh i, w; > 0, is her initial 
endowment oí' lhe private good. The initial level of all public goods is zero. 
The technology for produeing public good I is deseribed by a funetion 
e,: ~ll + -> ~)¡ +, where e,( y,) is the amount of private good required to obtain the 
level y, 01' public good l. We assurne that for each lE L, e, is eontinuous. strietly 
increasing, and satisfies (",(O) = O. Given y = (y l' ... 'Yk) we will use d y) for the 
list (el(YI)"" ,e.(Yk»' J 
Tú surnmarize, an eeonorny is a triple e = (u, w, d, where 11 = (u l •... ,11,,), 
w = (w l ' ... ,w,,), and e = (el"" ,c.). 
An (/lIo("atioll z E m~+\ is a list (XI' X1"" ,X"' y) where for each i, (X;, y) is 
agenl j', eonsumption. 
Given e E ¿f. an alloeation ~ is feasihle/(¡r e if E,x¡ + E,c/(y,)::; L,W¡. Let 
A( e) be lhe set of feasibJe allocations of e. 
An alloeation z is Pllreto-oplimlll fiJr e if z E A( e), and there does nol exist 
another ::' E A(e) such that u¡( x;, ),') ~ 1I¡( X,. y) for all i, with strict inequality 
for sorne i. Let P(e) be lhe sel of Pareto-optimaJ allocations of e. 
A cOlllition S is a non-empty subset 01' l. 
The allocation :: = (x, y) E A(e) can be improL'ed UpO/j bv S if there exists 
(x;)¡ E s' and y' E ~H: such that: 
(i) Ls.r; + L, ck ( y;) ::::; L.I· W¡ and 
(ii) Vi E S, (/¡(x;, y') ¿ u¡C..:¡, y), with strict inequality for some j. 
An allocation l E A( e) is in the Foley-core of e i1' there does not exist a 
coalition S that can irnprove upon l. 
An allocation lE A( e) is illdÍl,jdually-ratiotllll}ór e if it cannot be irnproved 
upon by 'coalitions' of cardinality 1. Let IR(e) he the set uf individually-rationaJ 
allocations of e. 
Rl'lIlark. The above definition of the coreo introdueed by Foley (1970), is not the 
on!y possibility. It incorporates the idea that all agents ha\'e aeeess to the 
produetion teehnology. and can by sorne means exclude others from the public 
good. This definition of individual-rationality is consistent wilh the definition of 
Pareto-optimality and the eore. It eould be labeled .. free access individual-ra-
tionality" following the Moulin (1989) terminology. Saijo (1991) ealls this 
requirement 'autarkieally individually rational'. At this level 01' ahstraetion we feel 
thal it is a more appealing definilion than lhe other polar case, that only by 
unanimity can produetion be undertaken. 
~ use . to denote the inncr product of two vector,. Thus 1'. e = 2: 1', X e, and he denotes the 
,calar multiplication ,,1 " by b. 
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Let .1" ~ 1 denole the l1~dimensi()nal unit simplex. 
Dejinitioll 2.1. A pair (r . .::) where r = (r l' ... ,r,,). each agent r, E ~H l .. and for 
each puhlic good k. I:, E N r,. = l. and z. = (x. y) E ~H:+k is a ralio eqllilibrillln. 
and z is a ratio allocation. for e = (11. w, e) if(i) Vi, x, + r, . d yl:S; IU,. amJ(ii) 
x;+r,·c(y'):s;(U, ¡hen u,(x"y);::: II,(X'"y'). 
Let RE( e) be the set of ratio equilihria of e. 
Le! (~; e t(,' be the domain of economies such that a ratio equilibrium exisls. 
Ratio Eguilibria uses a simple fmm of non~linear pricing. The numher riA has 
the simple interpretation: 'the share of the cost of public good k thal i i~ rC<.juired 
to contribute'. 
DejillitiOll 2.2. The ratio correspolldellce. R. selects for each e E (~; Ihe set 01' 
ratio allocations for e. 
We close this section by presenting some simplifying notation. 
Given an economy e = (//. W. c) and nn allocation .:: = (.r •. r>. ror each i let 
R ¡ ( X ¡. y) = {«. v') E ~H l., ~ 11/1, ( X;. y') ;::: U ¡ ( x" y) } 
and p¡(x,.y)=rcl.illt(R,(x,.y». where rel.illt(X) is the relative intenor of X. 
We will use the convcntions. 1I,(:')=II¡(X,.y), R,(.::)=R,(x,.y)X~l\~~1 and 
P,< z) = rcl. illt( R ,( 1: ll. 
Given a list of ralios rE JÁ(,,~ 1). let 
H,( r. e) = {( x'" v') E ~H~+ Ilx', + r,c(,v') :s; wJ 
Let (S,), E N he a family 01' seIs, where S, is the strategy s{J{/ce o( l/gellt i. A 
Kame .fárm. r. is a pair (S. g l. where S is the Cartesian product of the -;paces S,. 
and g: S X K' ..... ~H" + k is the outcome function. 
If g(.\·.(')=.::=(.\',y)=(xl ..... x".)'). wc let g,(s,c}=(x,.\,). g,(s)=x. 
and g r( s. e) = y.Nole that at this stage we have not required that Ihe outcome 
always he feasible. that is for somc s. for so me i. it may be Ihal ,ICi( s. (') tE ~H: + ). 
Therefore we exlend the definilion of each agen!' s utility function in ';uch a way 
that given an outcome such Ihal for some i. g,( s. e) tE ~H ~ + l. then 1/, ( g,( s. e) < 
11,( w,. O). This approach was inlroduced by Hurwicz (J 979a), 
If a mechanism r = (S. g) is such that for all l' E/::. ror all strategy profiles. 
the outcome 01' the r is feasihle: that is 
VI' E X. and "1.1 ES. g(.I'. (') E A( l'). 
Ihen we say r is a ji'asible mec!ulIl;sm 01/ g'. 
Given a strategy profile s. the coalition T and (.<), E T' let the stralegy profile (j 
he egual lo s' on T and ,\' on the compliment of T. Then define: 
d .1') = 11, ( g ( ,\'. e) ) . 1'; ( ,\' I •. \ _ r) = 11 i ( g ( (T , e) ) . 
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ano 
/', ( .\, ,\"_ ,) = 1/, ( X ( s, .I'~. e) ) when T = N/ { i} . 
Given a mechanism r and an economy e, as the outcome function yields an 
allocation for t!ach Iist of slrategies and the utility funetions of the agents then 
yicld a utility payoff for each strategy profile, Ihe pair (r, d defines Ihe game r 
played in e. 
{)ejlllitiol1 2.3. Given an economy e = (u, w, d, and a mechanism r= (S. g), a 
stratcgy profile s is a Na;;h cquilibrium of r played itl t' ir 
Vi E 1, Vs; E Si' 1',(.1') ~ I'¡( .1'; .. I·_J. 
N( r. e) is the set of Nash equilibria of r played in e. We will rcfer to an 
allocation thal is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium a;; a Nas/¡ eifuilibrium 
al/o('atioll. NA( r. e) is the sel of Nash equilibrium allocations of r played in e. 
Dtjillitioll 2.-1. Given all economy e = (11, w, d, and a rnechanislll r = (S, g), a 
stralegy profilc .1' is a .1'1 roug eqllilihrillll/ 01' r played ill t' i f Ihcrc does nOI exist a 
coalilion T and a list of strategies. (.I';)¡ E r' such thal 
Vi E T. /, ( s~. s _ r) ~ c,( .1' ) 
wilh slrict inc4uality for some i E T. 
s( r. el is lhe set of slrong equilibria of r played in e. SA( r. el is lhe sel of 
slrong equilibrium allocations uf r played in e. 
We will considcr lhe following sub-domajns of (":': f;; e (t:'. Ihe C/a.l'.I'ical 
ECOl/omie.l', where each agents utility funclion is quasi-concave, and each cost 
function i:-. convexo Le! r" e 1"; be the e.~s('milll ecmw".ies. where all gonds are 
essential, lhat is 
Vi if ( x,. y) E a:H ~ + 1, ( x;, y') E :H ~: I lhen u ¡( X" y) < 11 ¡( X;. v') 
where él ~H :' I denotes lhe boundary of ~\{ ~ + l. 
3. Results 
3.1. A marke/ gwne 
D(p'lÍtion 3.1. The COI! SI/{{/'(, GillIll' r\ = (S. g) is ~p~cificd hy lhe follüwing 
components: 
(i) V ¡E/, S, = (O, l]A X :H' with generic dement .1', = ( r¡. y,). 
(¡i) g: S ...... ~)l"H where. g(s. e) = (g,(.I'. e), X,(.\', c» = (w 1 - 1'1 . 
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C(Ly) ..... wll-rll·cO.:y);LV) if'VI L:'~lr¡l~ l and Ly¡~(). amI g(s.e)= 
( w l' ...• w,,; O) otherwise. 
The first component of an agent's strategy space is the propon ion of Ihe cost of 
providing each good she will pay, and the second component is an incremental 
change in the level of each publie good. 
Propositioll 3./. Gil'e/J (/11.1' e E 6,.. e/l/y ralio ec/uilibritllll allocClli(l1/ (or e is a 
Nas/¡ eC¡lIilihriwtl oulcO/tle ol lile g(//l1e TI played il/ e: R( e) e NA( r l • e). 
P/"Oo¡: Lel e E 7.; be gi ven and suppose (r. ::) E RE( e). For all i. lel S¡ = 
(r¡. Y/II). Then g( s. e) = :. We daim thal s E N( rl' e). Con),ider a deviation by 
agent i. If she declares ,.;/ < t il rol' some 1, then L j" ¡I", + r; < 1, and g i( s) = 
(w;,O), which by Ihe individual-rationality of RE allocations is (weakly) inferior 
ror her to (x,. y). Furthermore. as any y' E ~)i ~ + I can be attained by playing 
.1"; = (r;. y' - {(n - 1)/II}y). and II¡ is strictIy increasing in x;, then if s; = (r;, y;) 
where for some /, ,.:, > 1'", .< cannol be a best response to .1" _;' Thus we need only 
consider devialions S; such that r; = r;. Hence. agent i faces lhe problem: 
maximize 1I¡<'<.Y;+{(Il-I)/II}Y). where .r';=w¡-r¡·ceV;+{(1/ -I)/n}y). 
By the definition of a ratio equilibrium. y, is a solution to this prohlcm. Thus 
1';( ,I·¡. s) ~ 1',( .1";, .1'_) for all s E S,. The same reasoning holds rOl each j E N. 
Thus s' E N( 1',. e) and :' E NA( r l • e). O 
Propositjofl 3.2. Gil'en Clny e E?:;., al/y Nasll eljuilibrilllll allOClIliol1 lit' Ihe ge/17le 
r l pl({yed in e ,mel! ¡//lIt Ihe {e{'el (Ir al leasl {l/I(' pllblic' good is POSilil'C, i.l· (/ mlio 
eqllili/Jrilllll Clllocalioll .ror e: NA( TI' e) n {;. E A( e)1 y =1= O} e R( e). 
Proo!: Let (' E E':, be given, s E N( TI' e) and :: = g( s, e). Suppose lhat g,.(.I') =1= 
O. then by the definition of g. for alI /. L¡ E ,r¡1 ¿ l. As each 11, is striclly 
increasing in x,. amI s E N( 1'1' ('). then. ror all /, L¡ E N 1'11 = l. Furthermore, as 
s E N( 1'" d. then :: E A( d and for all i, .v, sol ves: max u;<-<, y; + {( 1/ - I )/n}y). 
subject to X¡ = ((J; -",. c( y', + {(" - 1)/II}y). Thus (1',::) E RE(e) and z. E R(e). 
O 
Remllrk. The key raet driving the above results is that the outcoll1e function g 
forces each agent to ael as a ralio-taker, where r¡ = l - L¡" j ",. In a CRS 
econoll1y, this reduces to being a price-taker, hence agents aet as if they were 
competilive. 
Relllark. COll1bining Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 does not exactly yield lhe result 
that 1', ill1plell1ents R on ~;, as the possibility remains that an equilibrium of I', 
for e may exist in which there is no production of the public goods. Such an 
alloeation is possibk in equilibriurn only if no agent on her own would undertake 
sorne production 01' one public good. Dne way to e\iminate the possibility of slIch 
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an equilibrium is lo modify Ihe mechanism so that if an agent under hids. lhen all 
agent's endowment are confiscaled. ¡.e .. ror al! ;. x¡ = O ir L,v r¡¡ < I for sorne k. 
Allother cure i~ lo assume thal al least one public good is essenlial for one agent. 
Then. as each agenl can choose a stralegy that will yield positive produclion. there 
cannol he a Nash equilibrium with no production. Thus we obtain the following 
CoroJlary. 
Co/"{}!I(/n' 3./. Gil"{'1I (/I/y e E X:"' (lny Nas/¡ e(jlli/ihriul/1 (/I/ocatio/l (JI" the game 
r, p/lIyed in e is (1 ratio eqlli/ihrium al/ocatiol/ .túr e: NA( r,. l') e R( e). 
Another approach is to strengthen the equilihrium concept. As implementation 
theory is conl'erned with proving the equivalence of the set of equilibriurn 
allocations of a garne and lhe sel 01' 4>-optimal allocations for each economy, there 
is a cost and a benefit to strengthening the equilibriurn concept. Ir for a given 
game SA( r. e) = 4>( e). then the outcornes are very robusl. No subset of the 
agents can conspire to upset any <f.¡-optirnal allocation. However. believing that 
only stn~ng equilibria will played imposes a greater belief in lhe sophistication of 
the agents. Ideally we would like to find a game where the sel 01' strong equilibria 
and dominanl stralegy equilihria coincide. However. il is impossible lo construcl 
such a g:.lme 011 our dornain. see Groves and Ledyard (1987). 
I'ro/JOSilio/l 3.3. Gil'el/ 1I/1.\' (' E ff.;, anv ratio equilihrilllfl 1I1/(Jcatio/1 .túr e i.l· a 
\'//"Ong equilihrill/1/ ol/lco/l/(:' o( Ihe gallle r, p/a,ved i/l e: R( e) e SA( r" e). 
Prool Ld l' E ff., he given and ~uppose ( ;:. ,.) is a ratio equilibrium for c. For 
all i let s,=(I",.V/II). Then gÜ.e)=;:. We c1aim that .~ES(r"e). Suppose 
there exists SOJ11e coalition T and stralegies (.<)¡ E rl = (1';, v;)¡ E r such lhat. if 
;:'=g,(.I'; .. I·-I.C> then Il¡Cr'¡. r')¿LI,(x¡.y) for all iET, with strict inequality 
ror sorne iET. If y'=O thcn a~ R(e)c/R(e). ll,(X;,y'):::;u,(x¡.v) for all 
i E T, thus .1" * O. Then by the definition of g, L1 r; ¿ Lr r¡ and so. L r r; . d y' ) 
¿ L1 r, . c( v'). Suppose that for some i E T. r;' d y') > " . d y'). Then there 
exist E>O such that _r;+E+r,·c(y')':::;IU,. As by hypothesis 1I,(x"y):::; 
LI ¡( x;, y'), then u, strictly increasing in x, contradicts :. E R( e). Thus for all 
i E T. r;. d y') = 1',' d v'). Therefore as :. E R(e). there callnot exist an ¡E T 
such (hat 1-'('1; .. 1' _ r) > I"¡( .\). Thus T cannot improve upon :::. Thus s E S( r" e) 
anu :. E SA( 1',. e). O 
Propo.l"itiol/ 3.4, Gil'ell lIIly e E?:,. a/ly .l"trol/g equilihriwll (/l/ocatio!1 .túr e ;.1" 1I 
ratio equilihrilll/l al/oca/ion fÍJr e: SA( 1',. e) e R( l'). 
Proo{ Let eEY,~. he givcn. sES(f'¡.el. and :=g(.I'.e). As MI'"e)c 
P( 1',. e), i f g \ ( .1") * O then Proposition 2 proves the result. 
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Ir g ,( \') = O. then there are two cases: 
(i) ::: = (w 1' •••• W II ' O) E R(d. and we are done: 
(ii) ;: = «Vi ••.. ,w
lI
• O) rt. R(e). Then let V, ;::') E RE(e). As for all i. (w¡. O) E 
8,(1'.('). we have that 1I,<.r;,y')?II,(w¡,O). We c1airn for sorne i. II,(X;.V'» 
II,«V,.O). lf not then 1m all i. 1I¡(X:,y')=/I,(w¡,O) and :::ER(e), contradicting 
hypothesis (ij). As R( e) * el the coalition J. by playing strategies s' described in 
Proposition 3 obtains the ratio allocation ;::'. Therefore J can obtain an alloeation 
such that I'¡(S;. s' ;> 2 /',(.~" s.,) for all i E J wilh strict inequality lor some i. 
Thlls ::: rt. PA( 1'1' e>. O 
We c10se this seetion by relating the above results lo the litt'fature. First 
observe that we 00 not rule out the possihility of increasing retuflls. Thus our 
results may seem to violate the result 01' Calsamiglia (1977), that it is illlpossible to 
realize. let alone implement, a sub-eorrespondence of the Pareto cOITespondenee 
with a finite dimensional strategy space when Ihere are increasing returns. The 
difference is Ihal in our ;mplemenl,ll;on problem Ihe designer has knowledge 01' 
the production technology (jt is the (eonvex) preferences thal are unknown) 
whereas Calsamiglia (1977) is con cerned with finding Ihe optimal allocations 
when preferences are known, bUI the (non-convex) lechnology is no!. 
Second. we note thal the game j'l does not ensure thal lhe oulcOIllC is always 
feasible: lor so me disequilibrium stralegy profiles, the contributillll lO public 
expendilure required of some agent may exceed her endowmenl. We pro pose a 
modified gallle lhal ovc:rcome Ihis problem. at the cosl 01' complicating the 
oUlcome funetion, in lhe next section. 
4. Implementation by a feasible and continuous mechanism 
The game 1'1 is extremely simple, however it has two technically undesirable 
properlies: the olltcome function is discontinuous, and it does not guarantee 
individual feasibility. In Ihis section we propose a modified game with a continu-
ous ano feasible ollleome fllnction that on ". double implements Ihe ratio 
correspondence. 
Discontinuity is considered undesirable as small 'trembles' away rrom an 
equilibrium slralegy may lead to a/locations very different fwm Ihe eljuilibrium 
allocation. In faet il is this very type of discontinuity that drives our previous 
resulls. Recently several authors ha ve questioned are such discontinllities neces-
sary. Aghion (1985) and Benassy (1986) have shown the impossibility of finding a 
market game w;lh a smooth outcome function and effieient Nash eLjuilibria. A/so 
Vega-Redondo (IY85) has shown lhe impossibility of finding, for tv.o person CRS 
economies, a sll100lh game form that implements the Lindahl correspondence. For 
CRS economies the two person case is comprehensively treateo by Kwan and 
Nakamura (1 l,Il,IO), who show that there is a continuous game that implements lhe 
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Lindahl correspondenceo The game r:. below also has a eontinuous outeome 
runction, but it is not smooth at equilibrium profilesoRecall that in the previous 
seclion we eXknded the domain 01' agents utility functions lo ~li 1. + I by assuming 
that any elemenl in the positive orthanl is preferred to any element not in it. This is 
an artificial cOJlstruction. and Ihe interpretation of negative consumptions remains 
problematico An alternative is 10 require that lhe outcome function selects an 
out(Oome Ihal. lor every strategy profile. is feasible and in every agents consump-
tion set. This approach has been labeled, implementation by a l'ompletely feasible 
mechanism, or feasihle implefl/entatíono 
In a seminal paper Maskin (1977) identified a necessary condilion that a 
correspondence must satisfy ir it can be implemented by a game that specifies 
such a feasible allocation for every strategy profileo Maskin's condition. called 
here Maskin-monotonicity. was stated for general abstraet environmentso ~ The 
applieation 01' Maskin monotonicity to our domain is presented belowo 
Definirion 40 Jo A eorrespondence 4J is Maskill-mollotonic 0/1 f!' if Ve. e' E g' 
such that, A(e)=A(e') and Vi, w;=w,. ir ~E4J(e) and Vi R',(~)ÍlA(e')C 
R, ( :: ) Íl A( ('), titen :: E 4J( e' ), 
Hurwicl et al. (1984) prove that on KII " L is IlOr Maskin-mol1otonico In 
particular, ir an economy e admits a Lindahl equilibrium allocation ~ such that 
S'lme agent's eonsumption bundle is on the boundary 01' her consumptioll set, (hen 
there is e' E ;<:"" such that (e. e', ;:.) satisfies the hypotheses 01' Maskin mono-
lonicity anu ~. fE L( e'), see also Tian (1988)0 Therefore, as R wincides with L on 
l." oo' it is not Illono!onic on r-.;o However. R does satisfy Maskin monotonicity on 
f',' 
Ll'mma 40 lo 0/1 x; ,o, R satis/les Mllskin mOllofOnicityo 
Prool Lct f'. (" E f'"o he given. and (r, ;:.) he a ratio equilibrium for eo Suppose 
that (e. e', ~) satisfy the hYPolheses of Maskin monotonicity and that ~ fl R( e')o 
Then for some i, R',( ~) Íl A( e' ) e R'( ::) Íl A( e), while R;< ~) Íl B,( r" e') *- 00 Let 
(x'"v')EP:C:,)ÍlB,(I'"e')o As eEK,('. if ~ER(e), Ihen rOl' all j, (x"y)E 
:H ~: lo Therefore, as 11 ¡ is quasi-concave and continuous 011 ~H ~: l. for all 
,E [00 l), if C\; . .\" l = t(". v) + (1 - dC<o y' l. Ihen (X;, \,') E P:(.\" .do Further-
more, as B,( 1'" d is convexo (x:. y') E' B,( r,. do However, as for all j, (xi' y) E 
~H ~ ~ 1, for large l. .< + c( y') < L wJo Thus there exists -:' E A( (') such thal 
( x:. \,1 ) E B,( 1',. e) Íl P:( x" y)o Thus (x~, y') E B¡( 1',. (') Íl P,( x,. y), contradicting 
:: E R(e)o O 
, F"r a pro"f 01' I\laskin o , Theurem ,,~e Saijo (/9X81. 
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Dejillitillll .J.2. The game fmm 1'2 = (S, M) is spe¡;ified by Ihe folluwing compo-
nents: 
(j) 'rJ iEl, S,=[O,ll'x~ll' with generic element s,=(r¡, l',). Gi"en rE 
.1(11 - ')k Iet 
r:,=(ril Il-L,yI,,1 
1- L/* ,1'/1 + -----
11 
ifLNr¡/~ J, 
(llherwise, 
and .ved be a I:Onlinuous fUIKtioll of s such that; for al! s, ror all i. r; . d\'( s» S; 
W¡, and when for all i. r:. (LNY,) S; W¡, then y(s) = L N y¡.1 
(ji) g: S -- ~H"+Á where g(.I·, e) = «(.ti, - r; . c(y<.d) ..... w" - r;, 
c( yed); ved). 
On !:\ .. all ratio equilibrill/ll allocations must be interior. SlIppose all agents 
play stratcgies used in the proof of Proposition 3.1. Consider a dcviatioll by agent 
i. From Propositio/1 3./. if i is to benefil. it must be because she fll(lVeS Ihe 
outrome 10 one Ihat was /1ot feasib/e given Ihe decIared ratios. But in J'~. no slIch 
unilateral oeviation exists. Furlhermore aH Nash equilibrium allocations mus! be 
interior. Thus. by /lIo/1utonicity, in an equilibrium, s, the dedareJ ratios. r. musl 
sum lo one. Let ~. = M( s. e) and suppose (z, r) is not a ratio equilibrium. Then for 
sorne agent, i. there must be a point, (x;, y'), in her budget, preferred lo (x,. y). 
Bul then as :: is an interior al!ocation, as in the proof of Lemma 4.1. aH strict 
convex cOfllbinalions (lf ( x, y) and ( .r'¡. y') are prefelTed lo ( x ¡, .d. Thus thcre is a 
fea,ible al!ocation lhat i can attain which she prefers lo :. amI so we lhe given 
strategies cannol he a Nash equilibrium. Similar argumcnts huid ror strong 
equilibrium. ano so Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 remains true ir \Ve replw:e anu /', 
with /'2 in Ihcír statements above. Hence líke Hurwicz el al. (1984) and Tian 
(J 989). we oblain feasible implemenlalion at the cost of restricting the domain. 
We sUl11marize wilh Ihe following Proposilion. 
Propositiot/ .J.5. 11/(',.e exists 11 f(,lIsihle ami C(J/ltiIlIlO//S MilI/U'. r~ .. lIIell tl/llt (1/1 
0, " re i!ouhle illlplc1/ICfII.l· the ratio corresl'0I1i!('l/ce: NA( 1'2' 1') = SA( 1'2' (') = 
R(e). 
s. Conclusion 
In Ihis paper we have examined the possibility 01' implemenling Parelo-optimal 
and individually-rational allocations in publit: good economies where agcnts have 
, Fllr exampk. a, eilch sel /l,( r. <,) is Ctlnvex for ,,11 ,uch r ~ () and lhe illl~rs"c,i"n ,,/ n"n-~l11ply 
nlllvex .seh is ll11n-cmply ¡¡nu co/)\'rx. l/len Wl' m.¡y wke r( J) lo oe Ihe pro/l'l"illll "r ¿" r, I>n 
n .v IJ,< r. (') n ~ll ~ , l. whlch is single valu,,¡J an¡J continuous. 
11
free access lo the lechnology. We found Ihe Ihal Ihe ratio correspondence. 
introduced by Kaneko ( I 977a) met our requirements. We double implemenled the 
ratio correspondence. by means 01' a market like game. Our first game rJ is 
ex(remely simple. and bears a close relationship lO Lindahl's proposal. However 
the outcome fum:tion did not always selecl individually feasible allocalions. nor 
wa~ jt conlinuolls. Our second game 1'2 was designed lo overcome Ihese 
prohlt.:ms. 
Given ¡he sjmplicity of the game formo and the robustness of double implemen-
tal ion. we think tha! (he cost share game may be a realistic proposal for solving the 
free rider problem when there is a small number of players who are well informed 
ah<Iut cach other. For example it could be used lo provide a ser of funding rules for 
research joint vcntures. or as a means of dividing joint costs among divisions in a 
Olulti-d;vision firmo 
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